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The Narrative Turn against Metaphor
M etonymy, Identification, and R oger Boyle's Pa rthenissa
A M E LI A ZU R C H ER

R oger Boyle's Pa rthenissa, published serially" thro ugho ut the 1650s , is o ne
of a group of mid seventeenth-century British prose romances that share a
penchant for p olitical allegory. In keeping w ith generic predecessors such as
Philip Sidn ey's A rca dia, Mary Wro th 's Urania, and especially J o hn Barclay's
Argellis, these lo ng and narratively com plex romances use their fictio ns o f
aristocratic lovers and soldiers to debate contemporary problems in ethics
and political th eo ry and to represe nt natio nal and international political
events. Most mid-century romance b ecame obscure w ithin a few years of
the R estoratio n , but Parthenissa was read well into the eighteenth century,
when by co nventi onal li terary history its outmoded genre would seem to
have been replaced by the more sophisticated and entertaining form of the
noveL Its extended popu larity was p robably du e in part to the notoriety of
its author: R oger Boyle, brother of the now more fa mous R obert and a
moderate R oyalist, was expected to go into exile after the execution o f
Charles I, but instead defected sudde nly to O li ver Crom well 's employ in
1650 and becam e a member of Richard Cromwell 's inner circle, o nly to
convince C harl es II at the R esto rati o n that he had been a loyal servant o f
the crown all along . D oubtless part o f the attraction of Parthenissa's generically typical roman a clef fo m1 w as the access it seem ed to promise to th e
inside story o f Boyle 's political career. ! But Parthen.issa is also intensely selfconscious abo ut literary fo rm and interp retati on, and at several moments it
begins to construct a model fo r prose narrative stru ctu re that in retrospect
turns out to have been oddly m o d ern . Against type, as it were, in these
m oments Boyle blocks allegorical reading, substituting metonymic contiguity for metaphoric correspondence as the paradigm both for his own narrative structure and for the kind of interpretation it requires. In this essay I
will read Parthenissa's pro nounced rej ectio n of metaphor as itself a metapho r,
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speculating on its function for Boyle as historical fantasy and critique. At
the same time, though, I will also approach Parthenissa's turn away from
conventional figural representation on its own terms, as a gesture toward a
kind of anti-interpretive poetics that has more in common, perhaps, with
the narrative forms that followed it than with those of its own genre.

Romance in England after Sidney and Spenser was already established as a
genre both allegorical and highly self-reflective, but Barclay's phenomenally
popular 1621 Argenis (published in Paris in Latin, but written after Barclay
had spent a decade in James I's court) lays out its allegorical mission with a
clarity no imitator could miss. rn these troubled political times, declares the
court poet who is Barclay's fictional counterpart, he will embark on a "new
kind of writing" and produce a "Fable like a Historie," in which readers
both famous and ordinary will see themselves "as in a Looking-glasse, "
come to new understanding of the events of their time, and be moved to
confIrm or reform their behavior accordingly.2 Like its exact contemporary
Urania, by Mary Wroth, Argenis offers not only one-to-one representations
of its handful of prominent readers but a collection of variously signifying
episodes for its lay audience, which is supposed to realize Barclay's didactic
aims by tracing both the internal correspondences of one episode to another
and also their varied external correspondences to the world outside the narrative. rn the 1640S and' 50S romances such as Percy Herbert's The Princess
C/oria and the anonymous Theophania followed this model closely, offering
a variety of lightly fictionalized stories of erotic and military allegiance
among their aristocratic protagonists in an effort to represent and thus rationalize the chaos of contemporary political events. Parthenissa adds another
layer to the pattern, resorting to a collage of episodes and figures from ancient history as the starting point for its narrative. Embroidering liberally
on information in Livy, Tacitus, Polybius, and Plutarch, Boyle takes as his
ostensible subject the early life of the Parthian King Artabanes (historically,
probably Artabanes II, whose reign is sketched only rudimentarily in Tacitus
and Plutarch) and his friends and rivals in the Parthian court. Most of the
romance's first and second books Artabanes narrates in retrospect to a hermit
on a deserted island, while he is still a young man with few political responsibilities and is lingering in despair over the apparent loss of his beloved Parthenissa to a rival. Over the course of this set of his adventures, Artabanes
tells the hermit, he has encountered Hannibal, Pompey, Marcus Crassus,
and a whole host of lesser figures from ancient history, whose stories Boyle
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weaves toge ther by supplementing them with eroti c rivalri es and military
exploits, aU with out regard to discrepancies in historical time. 3
Boyle's historical m ethod makes it diffic ult to read Parthenissa as straight
political roman a clef in the style of A rgenis and The Princess C loria. Indeed,
in the dedication of the first book to Lady Northumberland, vi a a conventional disclaimer abo ut his inability to represent her tru e glories, Boyle disavows any allegorical refere ntiality fo r his characters and hints that rea ders
should approach them instead as companions. 4 But Boyle's m ost extraordinary and sustain ed demonstration of his anti- roman a cl ef m ethod comes
shortly afterwa rd in Book I , during Artabanes's acco unt of his life to the
hermit. About sixty pages into his story, Artabanes and his servant, sharing
narrative duties, begin reciting, in the firs t person, Plutarch 's acco unt of
Spartacus, fro m his Life oj Ma rClls C rassus, and suddenly the reader, along
with th e shocked and thrilled hermit, is bro ught up sho rt by the realization
that Artabanes and Spartacus are the sam e m an. " 0 gods," cries the hermit,
" is it then Artabanes ... who so fill 'd the world with his generous Actions,
that not to have heard of him is as great wonder as any he perform 'd?"
" This," repli es Artabanes's servant, with a gesture toward his master that
functions do ubly w ithin Boyle's narrative fram e and his own embedded
one, " is that same Spartacus" (89). Fleein g Parthia because of Parthenissa 's
apparent infi deli ty, Artabanes had been captured at sea by Pompey and sold
to th e R o man w ho trai ned Spartacus and o th er prisoners of war as gladiators, and from th ere he was laun ched on the bri ef career that to the hemlit
is already legendary. At th e hemlit's urging Artabanes and his servant continu e the story, taking a detour into th e history of the Second Puni c W ar to
bring Spartacus into contact with H annibal and one of his Capuan opponents, a you ng man named Perolla mentio ned o nly bri efly in Livy for his
political opposition to his own fath er.5 Artabanes embeds within his narrative the very long story ofPerolla's star-crossed love affair, recounted at one
remove in the fi rst person by Perolla's lover an d eventu ally adjudica ted by
Spartacus himself, and then he resorts again to Plutarch to narrate his own
(that is, Spartacus's) last campaign against M arcus C rassus. At the point of
Spartacus's ostensible death , obscure in the classical sources, Boyle has him
resume the nam e of Artabanes and set sail for Parthia to rejoin his previous
narrative traj ectory.
One of the few historical surveys of seventeenth-centu ry literature to
take any account of Parthenissa, obedient to the allegorical hermeneutic
norms that govern most seventeenth-centu ry romance, concludes that Artabanes is a " Spartac us-figure" (and both characters, as rebels against established autho ri ty, probably also fi gures for C romwell).6 A figure for
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Spartacus, however, is exac tly what Artab anes is not. On the contrary, in
this scene Boyle brings together two characters from distinct and non- intersecting historical narrati ves and then, against all convention, asks the reader
to understand th em not as parallel but as identical. It is almost as if Boyle
se ts out to make entirely literal the representational proj ect Barclay provides
for modern romance: as story- te lle r, Artabanes peers into the "Lookingglasse " of Plutarch 's account and finds not an alternative version of his story
but his very own self Argenis and its gen eric heirs offer their audience a
mimesis, a re-presentation; Par/henissa offers, in contrast, a model of absolute
identificatio n-ide ntifica tion, that is, not as the mostly metaphoric process
we often mean by the word, according to which a read er or character feels
such affinity with another's position that sh e sees the world as if throu gh the
other's eyes, but rather a complete collap se of o ne character and his narrative
into the identity and th e narrative of another. And the identifi cation occurs
b etween characters who seem to sh are almost nothing. Not only is there no
indica tion, before his capture by Pompey, that Artabanes has any militaristi c
ambitions o r Spartacan cannin ess, but after his stint as Spartac us he reverts
entirely to his identity as despairing lover, as if his own lege ndary feats had
no thing to do with him. Within a genre that so freq u ently, carefully, and
exph citly exploits the techniqu es of roman a clef, it is difficult to read this
model of identification as anything but a deliberate dep arture, Boyle's notification that he m ea ns to block the kind of analogical correspondence romance has tau ght us to expect.
If the peculiar manner in which Boyle incorporates Spartacus into Artabanes's narrati ve will not allow us to read one character as metaphor for th e
other, Parthenissa's Spartacus story is also antifigural in anoth er sense. In his
ca reful revisio n of Aristo tle's relati on between plot and character, Julius
Caesar Scaliger argues in his own I56I Poetics that while the good poet canno t be said to teach "character" per se, since in a typical plot "many things
are done contrary to character," the poet does no netheless teach " disposition, " as nothing can be done in a plot unless a character is disposed to do
it. " Action , therefore," Scaliger concludes, " is a mode of teaching," and
disposition, th at which w ithin the plo t spurs a character to action , is "that
which [readers] are taught. " 7 While it would be going too far to claim that
Scaliger reverses Aristotle's primacy of plot over character, it is clear that
disposition for Scaliger-a kind of fore-conceit for action, what he also calis,
quasi-Platoni cally, a "form " or con ception-is the object the poet m eans to
convey (7 .I.3 ), and that this fo re-conceit is lodged as finnJ y in the poet's
hterary characters as it is in his o r her mind. Erich Au erbach's well-known

h

The Narrative Tllrn against Metaphor: Boyle's Parthenissa

77

summation of Christian figurative practice defines the work of the figure as
the establishment of a temporal relation between one event or person and a
second, the goal of which is to encompass or fulfill the fmt, in both a spiritual and a concrete, even "carnal" sense. s And Galenic humoral theory, a
dominant model for understanding human behavior in the early modern
p eriod, held that people were disposed by their constitutions toward certain
actions. 9 If we combine these th eories, all part of the bedrock of early modern conceptions both of poetics and of psychology, it b ecom es possible to
understand a character's disposition as itself a figure, an o utline that a wellconstmcted plot then fulfills through its action . Effective narrative needs to
surprise its audi ence through anagnorisis, but it also needs to confirn1 the
audience's expectation, in effect convincing the audience to be surprised at
what, in some sense, it has know n all along. In the Ari stoteli an-Scaligerian
tradition inherited by ea rly modern romance, character as figure is one of
the essential tools in this task, a device by which poets m ay adumbrate and
thereby justifY their design.
Early modern English narratives play self-consciously and frequently with
this idea. Marlo we's Tamburlaine, for instance, is the playwright's exuberant
retort to Scaligerian poetics, the warri or who outrageously defies any disposition that co uld possibly inhere in his shepherd- iden tity as he improvises
himself into being, right in fro nt of the play's audience. Boyle challenges
co nvention via a different path, by introdu cing into hi s n arrative a character
wh o brings with him a long tradition of being dispositionless. Eventually
w estern culture will adopt Spartacus as a historical figure-in retrospect he
becomes an an ti cipatory paradigm for eighteenth-and nineteenth-century
Europ ean movements against African slavery and imperialist domination,
and even later (via Stanley Kubrick's ftlm) for the cause of gay liberation in
th e United States 1°-but in the ea rly modern period he is still a cipher. In
Plutarch and Appian, th e fullest classical sources, his story appears riddled
with gaps and inconsistencies. He is a Thracian, known to the R omans and
their sympathetic historians as mercenaries and cowards, and the success of
his escape from the sure death of the gladiators' pit and then of his threeyear campaign against some of the best ge nerals R ome has to offer is seemingly without precedent, not only fo r a Thracian slave but for anyone. (As
Boyle comments in his preface to the second part of Parthertissa, " Past ages
cannot Parralell " him, " neither doe I beleive the Future will. "I I) In most
classical acco unts his motivations re m ain shadowy-pe rh aps he meant to
challenge the Romans, but perhaps instead he was simply trying, Odysseuslike, to usher himself and his fellow-slaves back hom e . Appian asserts that
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after his fin al defea t by Marcus C rassus his body was never fo und, one last
mystery in his mysterious life. 12
By sidestepping the ancient prejudice against Thracians and offering a
substitute for the frustratin gly shadowy account of Spartacus's death in the
classical sou rces, Boyle's revisio n does ostensibly answer some of the problems in the histo ri cal record . It seems unlikely, however, that Boyle expected his audience to understand th ese changes as making any claim to
facticity or adding m uch ballast to the conventional story. On the contrary,
Parthenissa frustrates closure by emphasizing Spartacus's lack of disposition.
Mid-century romance, as I have argued elsewhere, tends to translate characterological dispositi o n into self-interest, understood in early modern
tho ught as the impulse toward those actio ns that it is most fundam entally in
a crea ture's natu re to perfoml. 13 Parthenissa is less prepared than any other
romance of th e period to offer an ethical justificatio n for self-i nterest and
more conce rned to disengage fro m the necessity felt to inhere in interest:
w here Cloria or Geo rge M acKenzie's Aretina condo nes self-interest as a
transparently ratio nal political mo tive, Parthenissa repu diates it as inimical
to true frien dship . In this light Boyle's story of Spartacus might be read as
Parthenissa's epitom e. Spartacus becom es a rebel by accident, because he is
at th e wrong place at the w rong tim e in his melanch oly wa ndering. He has
no intention of chall engi ng the R oman empire, and indeed , near the close
of his campaign he chooses not to adva nce on the city of R o me beca use he
does not wish to " insult" his enemy. Apparently without ambition or any
kind of desire that could establish a traj ectory for him , in Boyle's account
he fails even to effect the suicide he has planned, via hand-to-hand combat,
because the oppo nent he has li ghted o n turns out to be an old friend from
Parthia who refuses to fight him . It is Spartacus's nature in Parthm issa, even
more than in the classical sources, to be inadequate to his own extravagant
story; that he is so exactly adequ ate to Artabanes is Boyle's M arlovian j oke
at the expense of conve ntional figural narrative.

J acques Amyot, in th e preface to his French editi o n of Plutarch's Lives,
whi ch Thomas N o rth includ ed when he translated Amyot's editi on into
English in 1579, asserts that the distinguishing feature of " Jives," as opposed
to histori es, is that they represent no t men's " doings and adventures" but
their "consultacio ns ," " the things that proceede from within" and lead
them to do what they do. 14 " Lives," for Amyot, are about Scali gerian disposition at least as mu ch as Aristoteli an ac tion. If it is fa ir to assume that Plutarch's Lives was understood in the early modern period as a sustained
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examination of disposition, then even in its relation to its source, Parthenissa's ftrst book seems to work aggressively against type. Not onJy does Boyle
ostentatiously signal, by Spartacus's relation to Artabanes, that we are not to
read the heroes as conventional allegorical ftgures for one another, but he
also resorts to a veritable catalogue of dispositions from which to borrow his
dispositionless character. In one of the anti-romances following on Charles
Sorel's parodic The Extravagant Shepherd (1627-28; translated into English
1654) such ironic emphasis might be its own end, but Parthenissa is too welldisposed toward romance, and too interested in its hermeneutics, for the
reader to stop there. If Boyle's characters are not allegorical representations
of one another, and the narrative of one is not constructed as a reflection of
that of the other, how might Parthenissa work instead? Or, to put the question another way, what alternative hermeneutic does the romance make
visible?
For modern readers, one obvious starting point is the antithesis between
metaphor and metonymy that RomanJakobson famously posits as the structural foundation of virtually all semiotic systems. Extending ftgural analysis
from words and tropes to the far broader category of topic, which in practice
comes to include even character, Jakobson argues that every topic jn a given
discourse is in ftgural relation to another, and that all ftgural relations can be
reduced to two primary kinds-metaphor, which relates topics by similarity,
and metonymy, which relates them by contiguity. Adapting Saussure's system of axes, Jakobson plots metaphor on the vertical, synchronic axis of
"selection" and metonymy on the horizontal, syntactic, diachronic axis of
"combination." Metaphor, for Jakobson, is a signifying practice essentially
independent of time (polysemy is a state, not an event), while the process
of metonymy cannot unfold except through time, as one topic follows or
precedes another. 15 Following Saussure, Jakobson holds that selection connects terms "in absentia," terms "conjoined in the code [i .e., Saussure's langue] but not necessarily in the message [parole]," while metonymic
combination conjoins terms "in the actual message" (119). Even Jakobson
cannot quite sustain this absolute djstinction between metaphor and metonymy-as he concedes elsewhere, "any metonymy is slightly metaphoric and
any metaphor has a metonymic tint" 16-but he does claim that one or the
other tends to predominate in a given Literary form . In general he associates
poetry with synchronic, selective metaphor, and prose (by which he seems
to mean mainJy narrative) with diachronic , syntactic metonymy.
Jakobson insists on the ftgural nature of both metaphor and metonymy,
but there are moments in his work that provoke the sense metonymy might
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be somewhat less fi gural than metaphor. Although he argu es that both metaphor and metonymy can " revitalize" conventional perception or conception, which is part of what he believes art mea ns to do , nevertheless in line
wi th many theorists after him (and with the American N ew C ritics' preference for poetry ove r prose) he finds m etaphor to be more revitali zing,
because "selection" seems to him m ore agential or creati ve than combination. 17 As a result, h e says, narrative featuring a high degree of contiguous
relatio n can give the impression that it is operating on autopilot, independent of a shaping consciousness-one result of whi ch, as he notes in a fasc inating essay o n Pasternak, is that active, agential voice and even agential
character often seem to drop out of hi ghly metonymic narrative. IHJakobson
wants to retain the complex syntactical possibilities of m etonymic combination, and he tries to avoid reducing contiguity to simpl e parataxis. At the
sa me time, tho ugh , th e relation described by meto nym y atJakobson's pole,
purified of selection (a limit case, as he co nc edes, not achi evable in practice),
seems to co nsist of little more than nearness, so that tautologically, contiguity at this extreme signifies little beyond itself Unlike m etaphor, at its limit
metonymy seems virtually nonfigural, right at the bo undary where words
stop being in relation.
Jakobso n's theory has been criticized for its reductive generality, whi ch
leads him into ove rsimplifications and inco nsistencies particularly on th e
subj ect of metapho r. But his use o f figuration as itself a m etaphor, if rarely
precise in a theoretical co ntext, is often usefull y suggestive, and for my purposes here his broad dichotomy b etween metaphor and metonymy offers a
provocative characterization of a central antithesis in early modern narrative. Ifwe apply J akobson 's logi c to narrative structure in a broad sense, we
might call narrati ve metaphoric insofar as its characters and episodes refer to
stori es and ideas o utside the narra tive proper (such as roman a clef or parable) or functio n internally as versio ns of one another (as in Shakespearean
drama, which fam o usly addresses one qu estion in several different contexts).
Or, we might call narrative metapho ric to the extent that its acti on or resoluti on can be seen to " fulfill " the shape it outlin es at the outset thro ugh
devices such as characterological disposition, in the model I traced earli er
that emphasizes dispositio n. Separately or together, th ese three optio ns
pro bably characterize th e large m aj o rity of literary narratives. By contrast,
we ca n call m eto nymic the narrative that foregrounds local , immediately
contiguous relatio n and generates its fo rm through the co ntinuous unfolding of events. Narrative is metonymic insofar as its elements are linked by
" and then," J akobson's quintesse ntial paratactic tool.
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In general, wh at I am calling metaphori c narrative tends to produce a
pronounced readerly impression of agency. In any metaphorical structure,
the vehicle delivers us to the tenor, but the process also w o rks the o ther
w ay, the fac t of the tenor bringing th e vehicle more closely into focus as
such , and for this reason metaphori c narrative shows a significa nt degree
of self- refl ecti o n , a quality often realized or emphasized thro ugh a stro ng
narratorial presence. (The many defi nitions of literary language as intrinsically self- refl ective-J akobson himself makes this poi n t-privilege metaphor over meto ny m y. 19) Correspo ndingly, and perhaps too beca use
selection can be understood as more agential and creative than combinatio n ,
as I suggested earlier, there is a stronger readerly presumptio n of design behind metaphoric narrative, whether authorial or divine. Insofar as arrival at
the tenor "answ ers" o r fulfills the vehicle, o r action ful ftlls character, metapho ri c narrative gives the impressio n o f being (or asking to be made by the
reader) a closed , coh erent system, one that has been " th o ught" in advance.
All th ese traits co ntribute to the sense th at metaphoric narrative represents
or inhabits a realm governed by aestheti c necessity (thematic or, more prestigiously, fo rmal), rather than by co ntingency-witnessed , for instance, in
Angus Fletcher 's descriptio n of all egori cal fi gures as agen tive " daemo ns"
bent on realizin g their signi fYing destiny, or Paul de M an 's association of
m etaphor and analogy with necessity in contrast to co ntigui ty 's openness to
chance.2o In literary history, metonymic narrative is most o ften metaphoric
narrative's poo r relation . Its plot appears to have been put in motion by
accident, ra ther than by destiny or the interests and designs of a narrator,
and it proceeds as if in dependent of a narrator's guiding hand, sometimes
seemingly even w itho ut any narrative voice. Like Spartacus's story in Parthenissa, w hi ch d oes no t answer or refl ect anything in Artabanes's before it,
th e elements in m etonymic narrative seem conn ected o nly arbitrarily, as if
th ey happened to fall along the same lin e by pu re chance. At its most extrem e such narrative appears simply to describe the world as it presents itself
randomly thro ugh time, in an endless paratactic sentence that is as fa r as ca n
be from Aristotelian plot.
This antith esis in narrative stru cture is paralleled by the ea rly modern generi c antith esis betwee n epic and romance. Epic will not m ap exactly onto
m etaphoric narrative as I have been describi ng it, but there are several similarities : m ost significantly, epic's emphasis o n destiny and teleology; the allego rical relations it establishes am o n g its own narrative, those o f it
pred ecessors, and hi story; and its tendency to ratio nalize its represented
world into a coherent system of analogies (the paradigm for w hich , by
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David Quint's powerful analysis, is the A eneid's elaborate analogic structure) .21 At the other end of the dichotomy, many of the faults for which
prose romance is often blam ed, from the seventeenth century onward- its
linking of o ne episode to the n ext by little m ore than parataxis, its attraction
to contingency and avoidance of cl osure, its lack of literary self-consciousness-belon g to m eto nymic structure. Broadly speaki ng, it seems fair to say
that if all prose narrative is to SOlTle extent metonYlTll C, as Jakobson hypothesizes, th en early modern prose romance (and much medieval romance before it) is especially so. Those early modern romances that aspired to cultural
prestige within a narrative culture that intensely privileged typ ology and allegory over other forms of representatio n- Sidney's epic revisioning of the
genre, fo r instance, or M ary W roth 's ca nny adaptation of episodic structure
for allegori cal purposes-had to w o rk hard to positio n th emselves well away
from the metonymic end of the continuum.
If my application of Jakobson 's bipolar fi gural schem e to early modern
narrative structu re were simply another way to name the fa miliar antithesis
between epic and rom ance, it would not be of mu ch use. Its valu e inheres,
instead, in the m odel it offers for reading early modern prose, especially romance. Interpretive criti cism , as J akobson notes, is itself a metaph oric disco urse, a " meta-language" w ith the aim of inscribing another version of its
obj ect, and insofar as it mirrors poetry's own metapho ric operatio n it constru cts a " homogeno us" system that answers the critical drive for coherence
and closure. Jakobson calls for something "comparable to the rich literature
o n metaphor" fo r m etonym y, but as he implicitly concedes, m eto nymy
does no t call fo r interpretation as such-indeed, an interpreted metonym
has become a m etapho r. 22 As a result, attempts to read early modern prose
figurally tend to privilege m etapho ri c stru ctures over metonymi c, even
w hen they strive to constru e figu ration as something m ore than local ornamentation . So, for instance, in Brian Vickers's sophistica ted reading of figura ti on in Francis Bacon 's prose, the local metaphors that stud the prose serve
as analogies fo r and thus keys to the argumentative stru cture as a w hole.23
Locating figuration at the level of narrative stru cture itself, by contrast, focuses our attention on the seams between elements or topi cs in prose narrative, encouraging us to see the narrative as a complex system of episodic
units in a variety of relations to one anoth er. Parthenissa, by this model, is
the sum of a vast num ber of narrative units, thro ugh w hi ch Boyle makes a
path by linking and differentiating them in a vari ety of ways . And J akobson's
bipolar model rerninds us that analogy is not the only criterio n according to
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w hi ch relationship can be constructed: contiguity itself m ay be an ideologicalor aesthetic choice on the part of the narrator, with the po tential both
to signi ty meaning and to structure rea ders' apprehensio n of the text.

In blocking the metaphorical correspo ndence that his fe llow romance-writers usually cultivate, th en, Boyle positi ons Parthenissa at w hat we might describe as the far meto nymic end of J akobson's continuum. By its nature
Parthenissa's unusually metonymic stru cture offers little by way of internal
explanation for itself, but even in the absence of self-refl exivity such a stru cture begi ns to make a demand on meaning. One of the central issues in
recent scholarship on early modern prose narrative has been the relation between fi ction and history, a relation that in early modern tho ught seems
only som etimes to have to do with their relative faithfulness to fac t. According to Mi chael M cKeon's no w all but canonical account, a large share of
fi ctio n's energy in seventeenth-centu ry England is devoted to the "categorial instability" between itself and history-a n uncertain ty about the essential
distinctio n between th em-that is n ot successfully resolved until the novel
emerges around 1720 to define history as factual in contradistinctio n to the
novel itsel f. 24 Extending McKeon's logic, w e might read Parthenissa's juxtaposition of Spartacus's ostensibly historical narrative with Artabanes's fi ction al one, a juxtaposition too dramati c to be merely naIve, as instead ironic,
a recognitio n that fi ction and history can no longe r be m etapho rically assimilated into one another. Itself a metaphor, that is, Boyle's metonymic link
between Spartacus and Artabanes would signity a more general tension in
seventeenth-century narrative between fac tu al history and imaginative fi ctio n, and an effo rt to open that tension to scrutiny.
From the retrospective point of view of the novel such an interpretation
seems sensible, but I am doubtful that facticity was really at issue for Boyle.
In his preface to The Princess C loria, Percy Herbert argu es that romance is
the only ge nre in which it is possible to express such histori cal events as
those of the r640s and ' 5 0S that dety belief, and by this dictum Parthenissa's
incorporatio n of Spartacus's unp recedented and unacc ountably successful
rebellion looks not anomalous or random but entirel y appropri ate. 25 For
Herbert it is no t romance's fi ctitiousness that separates it from other kinds
of narrative but its departure from probability, a quality that history predicated on fac ticity sometimes shares, as Boyle may mean to point out in borrowing Spartacus for ro mance. As I have suggested, Boyle and Herbert were
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both working in the quasi-Aristotelian tradition ofScali ger, whose influenti al Poetics classifies all discourse as philosophical, rhetori cal, or pleasing, and
puts fiction and history together in the last category as dual exampl es of
n.arratio, by its very nature delightful. Fo r Scaliger fiction is distinct fro m
histo ry as much beca use it is instructive as because it lac ks basis in fac t-an
idea that Philip Sidney, of course, would later develop at length.26 And Scaliger comes close to arguing that the obj ec t of fi ction's mimesis is itself imaginary, that the " fo rms" the poet imitates are found chiefl y no t in nature
but in other texts.27 M y point is no t that early modern thought lacked any
distinction between history and fic tio n o n the gro unds of facticity, but
rath er that there is generi c and h em1eneutic context for Boyle that makes
fac ticity onl y one criteri on by whi ch th e two genres might be differentiated
fro m or likened to one another. lndeed, in the preface to the second part
of Parthenissa Boyle concedes that he violates historical veracity by putting
Hannibal in the sam e tim e frame with Spartacus, but also counters that the
lessons usually offered by the stories of these two men are in no way vitiated
by his own narrati ve play.28 Fictio n in Parthenissa may no t be an allegorical
figure for history, but neither does it get in history's way, beca use history
for Boyle i·s a series of episodes that retain th eir nature and valu e in a va riety
of settings.
If th e point of Boyle's metonymic structure, th en, is not to draw sp ecial
attention to any distinction between fi ction and history, w hat else might it
signify? Besides its episodic and open-ended nature Parthen.issa manifests several of the o th er characteristics J akobson assoc iates with m etonymic narrative, especially its disinclinati on to represent narratorial agency. One of the
striking formal fea tures of mid seventeenth-centu ry ro mances such as C loria,
Eliana, and Aretina, in compariso n w ith their predecessors by Ariosto,
Spenser, and Sidn ey, is that they rarely foreground their authorial narrators,
but Parthenissa takes this to an extrem e, reco unting almost all of its plo t via
fi rst- perso n reminiscence by its characters and sometimes embedding its stories three frames deep. Boyle's romance also echoes at the level of theme
th e metonymic associatio n with " free" pl ots rather than th ose that present
themselves as governed by necessity or fa te. O ne of the central arguments
of Parthenissa's m ale lovers, for instance, is that male fri endship is ethically
superior to heterosexual erotic love, o n the (Montaignean) grounds that it
proceeds from " inclinatio n," by w hich Boyle means som ething close to reasoned choice, as o pposed to the seeming fa tedness of erotic love (e.g. 566,
573) .29
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As we might expect of someon e enslaved, Boyle's Spartac us himself asse rts the value of fre edom , but in oddly narrative terms. Contemplating a
m arch on Rome, he tells his company that its real advantage would lie not
in vi ctory but in its indicatio n to the Romans that the rebels act according
to " o ur election, not our n ecessity" (242), that they transcend the narrative
ambit usually prescribed for slaves. Sh o rtly thereafte r Spartac us decides
against the march , because if he wo n he w ould insult the Romans and because, as his servant concludes, he is suffused by a deep " Melancholy" (244).
Spartac us's repeated disinclination or inabili ty to act, w hich is echoed by
several of Boyle's other heroes, mi ght seem at odds with his valo rizati o n of
freedom , but it m ay well have been m ore conventi o nal in the early modern
p eriod, nervous as it was about the ethics of a self- interest indep endent o f
providence or community, to assoc iate agency with n ecessity than with
choi ce. We mi ght think, fo r instance, of the stoi c embrace of necessity as
the only basis for virtuo us, disinterested agency. T hrou gh o ut Parthenissa its
h eroes express the wish to free th em selves fro m n ecessity and fate, but like
Boyle-as-narrator, hiding in the w ings , th ey are relu ctant to claim their own
interest and th e co rrespo nding power of design. P erhaps, w ith Jakobson, we
can read this reluctance as a sort o f psychologization o f m eto nymic stru cture, or, vice versa, as the thematic gro und for the fo rmal abstractio n into
m etonymy. Ironically, the correspondence of the two pro vides evidence of
an urge toward metaphoric coheren ce that may be inescapable in narrative.
There are also several possible an alogues available outside the tex t for
Parthenissa's m etonymic structure. One is what we kno w of Boyle's biography: as [ noted earlier, he took th e R oyalist side until 1650, w hen , probably
en route to France, he was arrested and " persuaded " by C romwell to switch
all egiance, and then at the R estoration he som e how m anaged to restore
himself to royal favor and became a servant o f th e crown in Dublin .
Throughout Boy le's political career his o pponents derided w hat they too k
to be his expedience. Tho ugh it is p ossible o nly to speculate, a person w ith
his history mi ght well have seen a reason to obscure o r disavow his own
agency and self- interest, or (more ch aritably) have felt a sense o f his failure
to effect his o wn narrative design in any theater but the m ost local . Another,
more textual analogu e for the ro m ance's meto nym y is suggested by the
w ork of revisio nist historians of th e mi d-seventeenth centu ry, w ho in the
[980s and '90S criticized both Whig and M arxist accounts o f the peri od for
being totalizing and detenninisti c. 30 In the revisio nist view the confli ct of
mid-ce ntury was pro duced not by an ineluctable shift in the zeitgeist towa rd
parliamentary d emocracy or against social oppressio n , but by myriad local
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tensions and events, working sometimes in harmony and sometimes in opposition. As in C larendon's History if the R ebellion and Civil Wars in England,
reclaimed for its sense of the power of historical contingency, in revisionist
history the execution of C harles I was almost accidental , the result of immediate constraints on and decisions by a sm all group of people who did not
intend to kill the king almost until they did so. Part of the critique of conventional history revisionists meant to make is that co nventio nal historical
narrative produces the effect of causality simply by stringing events along a
timeline , which draws attention to their similarities and differences and in
turn makes later events seem resp onses to earlier ones. One complicating
factor is that not o nly characters in history and fiction but people in the
world act as if they were in metaphorical narratives, organizing events according to the principle of causality in order to decide what to do next.
To resist this tendency, revisionist historiography recalled us to metonymic
narrative as I have been describing it, narrative that demands attention to
the absence of anything but contiguity between or among its elements and
denies the existence of coherent, systemic agency. A fully m etonymi c historical narrative, as revisionists well kn ew, would approa ch a contradiction
in terms, if history 's task is conc erned with ca usality, and post-revisionist
historians have recuperated long-term ca usality and insisted on the analogies, for instance, between social and politi cal thought and between the ideologies of political elites and the middling sort.3 1 But perhaps Boyle, like
Clarendon after him , found at least some prec edent in the events of his own
lifetime for a view of history as random and contingent, and perhaps, too,
the attraction of that precedent registers not just a biographical but a more
general cultural wish to escape historical agency or responsibility.

As I have been emphasizing, these ideol ogical motives for Parthenissa's structure are only speculative, merely hypotheses about w hat Boyle's metonymy
might signifY as itself a figure. On e of the questions Parthenissa challenges us
to ask, by so blatantly blocking metaphorical correspondence, is w hether it
is inevitable that m etonymy register as a metaphor, and here once again
Boyle's treatment of the Spartacus story is illuminating. If Parthenissa's Spartacus does not call for figural interpretation, what does Boyle ask of his audience instead? In this case, as I suggested earlier, the answer seems to be
identification. When Artabanes first acknowledges that he is Spartacus,
Boyle has him pause in his account for a full page w hile the hermit models
for the reader his wonder at encountering this historical legend in th e very
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flesh. What is strange about the reader' s relation to Spartacus at this extended moment is that, with the hermit's, it feels unmediated by the apparatuses of narrative. In effect Spartacus steps out of his historical frame into
Boyle's fiction, suddenly materializing in th e narrative present without any
set-up or context. And in the state of surprise Boyle has fostered by withholding narrative preparation , we as readers are mo m entarily precluded
from summoning up our own seri es of frames (Plutarch, ancient Roman
history, tales of rebellion , etc.) with which to locate Spartacus and instead
seem to join him there, as if we were suddenly inside the familiar story ourselves. Just as Artabanes identifies himself absolutely with Spartacus, so our
world seems to becom e conflated for an instant with the narrative we are
reading, Barclay's mirror dropping away.
This uncanny sense dissipates quickly, but Boyle reminds us of its presence several times in the romance, at various moments when our attention
is brought to the process of reading or listening. One of the oddest is a brief
episode recounted to Spartacus by Izadora, the fictional lover Boyle devises
for Perolla . Izadora is in the middle of telling Spartacus her own complicated history w hen she pauses to discuss the remarkable Amazora, an inhabitant of a city H annibal besieged on his way to Rome. During the siege
Amazora recognized th at th e city's women were consuming the limited
supply of food without doing anything to resist H annibal, and tm e to her
name she decided to rally all the women of the city "to whom Glory was
more pleasing than Life" and lead a nocturnal escape over the city walls.
Unfortunately Hannibal's army "cmelly murther'd" the entire party (11 I).
When Perolla arrived after the fac t and heard the story (before he met Izadora), he killed fifteen hundred Lybians in retaliation and then fell in love
with the dead woman. Amazora's "Fire was of so peculiar a quality," recounts Izadora, " that w hen it had reduc'd her to ashes, those very R eliqu es
retained heat enough to inflame him , and perhaps there has been seldom
heard of a Love so strange in the Birth, in the Life, and in Death. For it was
created by an object that was dead, the Effect remained w hen the Cause was
taken away, and having no material sustenance to preserve it selfe alive"
(1 II). In fact, Izadora generously concludes, ofPerolla's heart she herself has
now "onely the reversion" (r I J)-a word that when used with th e definite
article in this period often means a leftover, as from a meal (OED [[ 4.a) .
lzado ra does not make any of the rationalizations about dead lovers usually
summoned when new ones have already taken their places: Amazora did
not lay the ground in Perolla for a better or even an equivalent love, nor
did PerolJa turn her memory into a N eoplatonic stimulus toward virtue. On
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the contrary, though she was present to Perolla only through a story, she
was nevertheless so real to him that she all-but-literally consumed a part of
him, her "Effect" as material as the original "Cause."
As at the moment ofSpartacus's recognition, Boyle in the Amazora story
seems to be trying to conjure an apprehension of literary or narrative character not as signifier or vehicle but as the almost-material real. Amazora will
never join Perolla within his own temporal frame, but she acts on him as if
she had, arousing all the responses that might be produced by a woman in
the flesh. Boyle may find a precedent in Mary Wroth's r621 romance Urania, especially in the extraordinary moment when the Wroth-figure Pamphilia enters an elaborately allegorical palace and literally "metamorphoses"
the allegorical figure of Constancy and the conceptual virtue she represents
into her own breast, reversing the trajectory of much allegorical interpreta tion and hinting that character, rather than concept, must be the reader's
interpretive endpointY But Boyle goes even further than Wroth, in that
whereas Wroth sustains the sense ofliterary character as a mediator between
conceptual idea and the real, extra fictional person in the world with the
reader, Boyle reaches to put the reader on virtually the same plane with the
literary I historical character. If metaphorical characters perform presence, reminding us of their distinction from the referent even as they assert their
similarity, characters in Boyle's metonymic narrative simply assert it, as if to
trick us momentarily into forgetting the artificiality of historical narrative,
or of history itself
Parthmissa's suggestion that reader and character might inhabit the same
narrative frame, however briefly, is on the surface an odd mechanism
toward identification. Usually readerly identification is associated with realistic characters, characters who through richness of descriptive and narrative
detail resemble "virtual persons" and thereby seduce readers into believing
temporarily that they have entered another wodd Y And realist characters,
by most accounts, are metaphorical rather than metonymic. In Georg Lukacs's prescription for historical realism, to cite one well-known example,
character must be "typical," by which he means not "commonplace" but
"possessing capacities and propensities which when intensified illuminate
the complex dialectic of the major contradictions, motive forces and tendencies of an era. " 34 Realistic character, for Lukacs, is a sort of microcosm,
reproducing in little within itself the enonnous burden of history. Tzvetan
Todorov too defines realistic character as metaphorical, arguing that the imputation of "psychology" that turns character from a mere narrative agent
to a person is a metaphorical recapitulation of the narrative action. Whereas
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in "a-psychological" (pre- or no n- novelistic) narrative a state or quality of
character is merely a precipitating conditio n, with no existence independent
of the action it provokes (something very close to wh at Scaliger means by
dispositio n), in psychological narrative such as the novel th e causal relation
between psyc hological state and act is so " diffuse" that the psychological in
effect detac hes itself from th e action , which was in fac t causally self- contained already, and shows itself to be a mirror, a " dupli cation," of the relations among th e various actions in the narrative. 35 Parthenissa, by contrast, is
entirely lacking in the kind of historical and psychological detail cited by
Lukacs and Todorov; not only is its character nonrepresentational , but there
is no content, in the realist sense, fo r it to represent. But even so, Parthenissa
suggests, the reader can be persuaded to believe for a mom ent that she
inhabits th e fic tional fra me; aga inst o ur retrospecti ve, novelistic expectation , metonymi c narrative does have th e pow er to enlist the rea der in
identification .
Identificatio n is a complex process, enacted in ma ny di ffe rent ways , and
at fi rst glance B oyle's versio n might seem like a footnote to literary history,
only one strange face t of a narrative unusual even among its historically obscure contemporaries. But Parthenissa's mode of enlisting readers, and indeed its metonymic strategies more generally, are probably not as sin gular as
they appear. In concluding I want to glance at their similari ty to the narrative strategies of an early novel with profo und and as yet not full y understood debts to seventeenth -century rom ance, Samu el Richardson's Pamela.
Richardson, as is well kn own, happ ened upon the proj ect of Pamela in the
process of produ cing a conduct book , and in the novel he goes to great
lengths to insist that he is only the edito r, not the author, of Pamela's histo ry.
But Pamela is not a mimetically realist character, and in fact Richardson
encourages readerly identifi cati on with her by means o f a mechanism quite
similar to Boyle's . Like Spartac us's successful rebellion, Pamela's marriage
to Mr. B is a social outrage, a narrative marvel that canno t be anticipated by
such tools as characterly disposition. Pamela, following in the steps of all real
romances, protests that it and its heroine are innocent of design: the novel
has no autho ri al narrator, and Richardso n 's brilliant technique of having
Pamela write " to the moment," in a m ode that parall els the sexual and social
passivity forced upon her, means that Pamela cannot be said to know the
narrative's ends or retrospectively shape its form any m ore than Richardson
can. To the extent that readers suspend disbelief in readin g th e novel , th ey
acqui esce not to Pamela's reali ty p er se, as a perso n in th e extrafi ctio nal
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wo rld, but to the narrative process by which the novel purports to be happening, its unfolding as if in the same " real time" in w hi ch its audience
encounters it. Certainly the contemporary readers who made Pamela's character such a publishing phenomenon identified with her, when they did, in
part as a form of social wish-fulfillment, and also probably because of her
vulnerability. But rea ders also identify with Pamela because Ri chardson
compromises our ability to see her as a type , a figure either fo r her audience
or fo r the actio n in her own narrative. It is not accidental, in this context,
that the strategy of the novel's skeptical debunkers from Fielding forwa rd
has been to read h er m etaphorically. It becomes impossible to put ourselves
in Pamela's shoes, Fi elding's Shamela insists, wh en we invoke the misogyn ist
stereotype that Pamela must have been from the begi nning-th e schemin g,
self-interested woman who buys her w ay with her sexuali ty-a nd w hen we
recognize her as a type we see that her disposition has cast the novel's end
as inevitable from its very beginning.
In a recent symposium on the problem of early modern dramatic character, J onathan C rewe observed that the popular (a nd to some extent even
scholarly) sense of Shakespeare's characters as "virtual persons" seems to resist all attempts at theory. Although we know at som e level that his characters are literary and theatrical effects, in m ost cultural fo ru ms we continue
to treat them as if they were people in the world wi th us. This resistan ce,
C rewe concludes, has proved so persistent that perhaps it is time to move
fro m dismissing it as naiVe to engaging its history. 36 Parthel'lissa, I have been
arguing, offers o ne episode in that history, a demonstratio n that "virtual persons " can be produced not just by drama and realist fi ction but by kin ds of
narrative in which we have not exp ected them to appear. It rem.inds us too
that identification is n o t just a default effect, the result of uneducated reading practices; o n the contrary, in B oyle's romance it is backed by its own
technology, a complex set of metonymi c practices that may have more to
do with the relation of romance to novel than we have yet understood.

